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et al.: "Suffer the Little Children…": Toward a Judicial Recognition of a

NOTES
"SUFFER THE LITTLE CHILDREN... ":1 TOWARD
A JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF A DUTY OF
REASONABLE CARE OWED CHILDREN BY
RELIGIOUS FAITH HEALERS
An increasing number of religious sects,2 including well recognized religions such as The First Church of Christ Scientist 3 and
Jehovah's Witnesses," continue to shun traditional medical care in
favor of healing solely by prayer. Reports appear to indicate that
sixty-three followers of one of these sects, The Faith Assembly, have
perished since 1976, forty-three of whom were children.'
1. Mark 10:14 (King James).
2. Several churches that claim to cure illness solely by prayer have reportedly been involved in the tragic death of children for want of medical care. These churches include: The
First Church of Christ Scientist; Jesus through Jon and Judy; Faith Temple Doctoral Church
of Christ in God; Christ Assembly; Jehovah's Witnesses; Christ Miracle Healing Center; The
Source; The Church of God of the Union Assembly; The Faith Tabernacle; and The Church of
the First Born. For a discussion of the facts of these cases, see Brief for Appellant at 16, 2830, Brown v. Laitner, No. 73903 (Mich. Ct. App. filed June 13, 1986).
3. See Swan, The advantages of ChristianScience healing, 104 CHRISTAN Sci. J. 569,
570 (1986). Christian Scientists believe that illness is a result of lack of faith. They believe
that illness and injury can, and should be cured exclusively by prayer and reaffirmation of
faith. As stated by the founder of the religion, Mary Baker Eddy, "[a] scientific mental
method is more sanitary than the use of drugs, and such a mental method produces permanent
health .... Id. at 570. Presently, there are 2,200 Christian Science churches in the United
States. See Dobbin, When a state takes aim at faith healing, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP.,
Mar. 24, 1986, at 22.
4. See Sacks & Koppes, Blood transfusion and Jehovah's Witnesses: Medical and legal
issues in obstetrics and gynecology, 154 AM. J.OB. & GYN. 483 (1986). There are 650,000
Jehovah's Witnesses in the United States. Their objection to traditional medical treatment is
limited to a prohibition against blood transfusions. Id. at 485. See generally Hirsch & Phifer,
The Interface Of Medicine, Religion and the Law: Religious Objections to Medical Treatment, 4 MED. & L. 121, 123 (1985) (analyzing the refusal of medical treatment for religious
reasons).
5. See Hirsh & Phifer, supra note 4, at 123; Ostling, Matters of Faith and Death, TIME,
Apr. 16, 1984, at 42.
6. Ostling, supra note 5, at 42 (describing the death of a one-year-old child of an adult
member of the Faith Assembly, due to untreated first and second degree burns sustained when
scalding tea spilled on her); see also Faith Assembly faces suit in federal court, Fort Wayne
News Sentinel, Feb. 3, 1984, at 1, col. I (chronicling the case of Oleson v. Freeman, No. F-8455 (N.D. Ind. filed February 3, 1984)), wherein a United States district judge denied defend-
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Faith healers fall into a convenient crack in the law that enables
them to engage in tortious conduct which is protected by the first
amendment.' In actions alleging church negligence, 8 often the plainant's motion for summary judgment on First Amendment grounds and inquired as to how the
practice of religion is related to negligence and other injuries cited in the complaint); Judge
refuses to dismiss suit against sect, Fort Wayne Journal-Gazette, Oct. 24, 1984, at 11, col. I
(descibing a judge's refusal to dismiss a complaint based on first amendment protection, since
the practice of religion is not related to negligence or any of the other acts the complaint
alleges).
7. See US. CONsT. amend. I. The first amendment to the United States Constitution
provides, in part: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.. ." These two clauses are "cast in absolute terms, and
either of which, if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash with the other." Walz v.
Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970). This potential conflict necessitates a continual
balancing of competing interests. There is no absolute method to complete separation between
church and state. Indeed, the very existence of the religious clauses gives rise to an involvement of sorts. See US. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, RELIGION IN THE CONSTITUTION: A
DELICATE BALANCE 18 (Sept. 1983).

8. In recent years, the tort of "clergy malpractice" has been the subject of much legal
commentary. The typical clergy malpractice action alleges conduct such as improper pastoral
counseling, intentional infliction of emotional distress, inadequate teaching or intentional interference with contractual relations. The plaintiffs sue as representatives of the deceased or injured child, or in the case of adults, plaintiffs are surviving family members. See, e.g., Nally v.
Grace Community Church, 157 Cal. App. 3d 912, 204 Cal. Rptr. 303 (1984), remanded,No.
67200, slip op. (Super. Ct. May 16, 1985), rev'd, 194 Cal. App. 3d 1147, 240 Cal. Rptr. 215
(Ct. App. 1987). In a second examination of the issues in the protracted Nally litigation, the
California Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's nonsuit of negligence and outrageous
conduct allegations against a church and its counselors which arose out of a failure to aid in
the prevention of a counselee's suicide. The court held that the first amendment does not immunize a church-affiliated counselor from liability for breach of the standard of care of a nontherapist counselor. The decision extends the recognized duty of psychotherapists toward their
suicidal patients and is now broad enough to encompass non-therapist counselors regardless of
whether or not they possess a religious orientation. The court held that a special relationship
voluntarily undertaken by the counselor which is reinforced by the church's advertising its
counselors as skilled in the treatment of emotional disorders, which leads to counselee dependence on his competence to treat emotional problems, gave rise to the duty to take precautions
in the event of suicidal manifestations. The significance of this holding lies in the recognition
that the duty of care imposed on one who undertakes treatment of emotionally disturbed individuals transends the counselor's religious affiliation or lack thereof; the significance is not in
the re-characterization of the obligations from "clergy malpractice" to "negligent failure to
prevent suicide" and "intentional or reckless infliction of emotional injury causing suicide."
See Baumgartner v. First Church of Christ, Scientist, 141 Ill. App. 3d 898, 490 N.E.2d 1319,
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 317 (1986); Zafrani v. First Church of Christ Scientist, No. 822639
(Super. Ct. of Cal., San Francisco County, filed April 11, 1984) (wrongful death action
brought by husband alleges that decedent relied on fraudulent misrepresentations made by
defendants as to their ability to cure her high blood pressure). See also Esbeck, Tort Claims
Against Churches and Ecclesiastical Officers: The First Amendment Considerations,89 W.
VA. L. REv. 1, 78-84 (1986); infra notes 11-15, 32 and accompanying text. See generally
McMenamin, Clergy Malpractice, CASE & COMMENT, 3-6 (Sept.-Oct. 1985) (attempting to
place liability on church organizations regardless of the constitutional limitation of separation
between church and state).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol16/iss1/7

2

et al.: "Suffer the Little Children…": Toward a Judicial Recognition of a
1987]

RELIGIOUS FAITH HEALERS

tiffs are unable to proceed with their litigation because of the constitutionally protected nature of church conduct under both the United
States9 and state1 ° constitutions. Although the controversy would be
justiciable if the defendants were private individuals, churches have
been absolved from civil litigation by virtue of the doctrine of separation of church and state."
Generally, courts are well justified in adhering strictly to the
doctrine of separation of church and state. They are concerned that
adjudication of a civil lawsuit would subject the courts to a flood 2 of
clergy malpractice lawsuits.1 3 Such lawsuits could also lead to a chilling effect on religious freedom, especially for smaller churches
which could ill afford the costs of litigation.1 4 Accordingly, in litiga9. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
10. See, e.g., ILL. CoNsT. art. VI, § 5; Miss. CONST. art. 3, § 18; OR. CONST. art. I, § 3.
11. See, e.g., Baumgartner v. First Church of Christ, Scientist, 141 Ill. App. 3d 898,
906, 490 N.E.2d 1319, 1324, cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 317 (1986) For a discussion of clergy
malpractice and an analysis of Nally, see Note, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by
Spiritual Counselors: Can Outrageous Conduct be "Free Exercise?", 84 MICH. L. REv. 1296
(1986); see also Esbeck, supra note 8, at 94-97 (citing several cases which outline the justiciability of the question of when a church can be held liable).
12. In other contexts the "floodgates argument," has been criticized by several courts. In
Borer v. American Airlines, 19 Cal. 3d 441, 563 P.2d 858, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1977), an
action brought by children for loss of parental consortium, Judge Mosk wrote in his dissent: "I
agree that [a line must be drawn], but I cannot subscribe to the majority's ad terrorem argument for determining the proper place to draw such a line ....
Id. at 460, 563 P.2d at 870,
138 Cal. Rptr. at 314 (Mosk, J., dissenting). See Berger v. Weber, 82 Mich. App. 199, 204,
267 N.W.2d 124, 129 (1978) (stating "The rights of a new class of tort plaintiffs should be
forthrightly judged on their own merits, rather than engaging in gloomy speculation as to
where it will all end.")(citing Borer, 19 Cal. 3d at 460, 563 P.2d at 870, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 314
(Mosk, J., dissenting)). See also Norwest v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hosp., 52 Or. App.
853, 631 P.2d 1377 (1981) (Roberts, J., dissenting) (stating that it was possible for a child to
prove that negligent medical treatment caused his mother to suffer brain damage).
13. See, e.g., Nally v. Grace Community Church, 194 Cal. App. 3d 1147, 240 Cal.
Rptr. 215 (1987); Handley v. Richards, No. 85-840 (D. Ala. Sept. 4, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed
library, Dist. file) (affirming the trial court's dismissal of a complaint against a minister which
alleged clergy malpractice and outrageous conduct).
14. See Nally v. Grace Community Church, No. 67200, slip op. at 3 (Super. Ct. May
16, 1985), rev'd, 194 Cal. App. 3d 1147, 240 Cal. Rptr. 215 (Ct. App. 1987). Courts have not
been deterred from imposing tort liability on non-clergy defendants, however, despite the possibility that inhibiting effects on segments of society might have ensued. See, e.g., Tarasoff v.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976) (finding
liability on the part of a therapist, because of a duty to the foreseeable victim of a patient,
despite the inhibiting effect that such a duty would have on the patient/therapist relationship);
Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984) (imposing a duty on the social host, to
victims of his guest's driving while intoxicated stating that the chilling effect on private socializing was overridden by the societal need to prevent the tragedy of drunk driving). See generally Note, Clergy Malpractice: Making Clergy Accountable to a Lower Power, 14 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 137 (1986) (advocating imposition of civil accountability upon members of
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tion which embraces clergy defendants, courts have found no duty1"
on the part of the defendant churches, thereby protecting their religious freedom.
The modern trend in deciding whether a civil court may adjudicate a controversy involving clergy as defendants has been to weigh
the competing state interest to be advanced by the determination of
a particular controversy against the possible infringement on defendants' first amendment rights.1 6 Where the court finds the state interest compelling enough to warrant the investigation of the charges,
jurisdiction will be assumed by a civil court.1" The great weight of
legal authority in the United States suggests that protection of the
health and welfare of children is most prominent among those state
18
interests adjudged to be compelling.
This Note will illustrate that the policy which supports the judicial rule of preventing adjudication of a negligence action against a
religious organization should not serve to insulate faith healers from
liability by preventing legal recourse to families of children being
sacrificed in the name of religion.
Part I of this Note focuses on the plight of children whose parents embrace spiritual healing, and the protected nature of this healing." Part II examines the doctrine of church immunity, focusing
the clergy engaged in religious counseling). The potential damper on religious faith healing
activity as a result of the imposition of a similar duty to act reasonably in the care of children,
is consistent with the state's role as parens patriae, when balanced against society's interest in
the protection of children. See infra note 25.
15. Baumgartner v. First Church of Christ Scientist, 141 I11.App. 3d 898, 902-03, 490
N.E.2d 1319, 1322, cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 317 (1986). The court affirmed the dismissal of a
negligence action against the Christian Science Church. The court held that in order to proceed with a cause of action in negligence, the plaintiff must allege existence of a duty of
reasonable care owed plaintiff by defendant, breach of that duty, and injury proximately
caused by the breach. The Illinois Court of Appeals was unwilling to recognize the existence of
such a duty. "In deciding whether a duty exists, the court is to consider the reasonable foreseeability of the injury, public policy, and social requirements, the magnitude of the burden of
guarding against injury and the consequences of placing that burden upon defendant." Id. at
907, 490 N.E.2d at 1325 (citing Morgan v. Dalton Mgmt. Co., 117 Ill. App. 3d 815, 454
N.E.2d 57 (1983)).
16. See infra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 477 U.S. 619
(1986) (holding that religious schools are not immune to regulations and defendant's constitutional rights are not violated by mere inquiry into the circumstances of an allegedly improper
termination of a teacher). See generally Wolman, Separation Anxiety: Free Exercise Versus
Equal Protection, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 453, 469 (1986)(stating that a key factor in determining
whether special treatment should be afforded to religious groups depends upon the nature of
the institutions involved). See also infra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 63-66 and accompanying text; see also cases cited infra note 79.
19. See infra notes 29-35 and accompanying text.
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upon the distinction between religious conduct and religious belief
and the resultant doctrine that conduct affecting children may be
exempt from first amendment protection. 0 Courts uphold first
amendment protection, however, even in the face of arguments that
the church's actions constitute secular "conduct" that can be regulated, as opposed to "belief" which is absolutely protected.21
Churches are not immune from civil liability in other areas of
the law. 2 Part III addresses the reasonable person standard as a
natural principle of tort law, and whether it can constitutionally be
applied to an inquiry into a faith healer's conduct as such conduct
affects children.23
Such an inquiry must focus on whether the regulation is furthering a compelling state interest through the least restrictive
means. The justifications for infringing upon a church's free exercise
rights are reviewed in Part III together with an analysis of the applicable state interest standards. 24 Part III illustrates that church exposure to civil liability is the least restrictive means to advance the
state's purpose of protection of its youth, a long recognized vital
state interest exemplified by the doctrine of parens patriae.25
Civil liability is also the most effective way to protect the youth.
Part III also discusses the conclusion that adjudication of a common
law negligence action against faith healers and the resultant imposition of civil liability will influence the conduct of future wrongdoers;2 6 this will offer some protection for the ailing child whose care
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

See infra notes 54-66 and accompanying text.
See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
See infra notes 36-53 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 67-75 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 76-99 and accompanying text.
"'Parens Patriae,' literally 'parent of the country' refers traditionally to role of state
as sovereign and guardian of persons under legal disability." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1003
(5th ed. 1979). See, e.g., In re Hamilton, 657 S.W.2d 425, 429 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983). "[T]he

state, as parens patriae, has a special duty to protect minors and, if necessary, make vital
decisions as to whether to submit a minor to necessary treatment where the condition is life
threatening ....
" Id.
For an overview of the Doctrine of Parens Patrie 42 Am.JUR. 2D Infants

§

14 (1969);

Annotation, Power of Court or Other PublicAgency to Order Medical Treatment Over Parental Religious Objections For Child Whose Life is Not Immediately Endangered,52 A.L.RI3D
1118 (1973); Annotation, Supreme Court Cases Involving Establishment and Freedom of Religion Clauses of Federal Constitution, 37 L. ED. 2D 1147, 1176-77 (1974). See also infra
notes 87-116 and accompanying text.
26. The 'prophylactic' factor of preventing future harm has been quite important in
the field of torts. The courts are concerned not only with compensation of the victim, but with admonition of the wrongdoer. When the decisions of the courts become known, and defendants realize that they may be held liable, there [will be] a
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has been entrusted to the faith healer.27
Finally, in Part IV a suggested basis for jurisdiction over defendant faith healers will be provided; there is a line of cases stating
that the secular nature of church activities, and in one instance, federal funding, gives rise to civil court jurisdiction. 8
This Note concludes that the state's strong interest in the protection of children is sufficient enough to subject religious faith healers to judicial inquiry and this interest overrides any accompanying
free exercise infringements.
I.

CHILDREN AS VICTIMS OF PROTECTED RELIGIOUS CONDUCT

Traditionally, courts have intervened and ordered medical treatment to protect the well-being of a dangerously ill child, as parens
2 9 The courts, however, have been unwilling to adjudicate
patriae
a
negligence action based upon withholding of medical treatment and
substitution of treatment by prayer.30 As a result, innocent children
suffer profoundly for the intractable beliefs of parents who insist that
prayer is an adequate substitute for scientific medical treatment. In
many cases, these children are denied medical treatment for illnesses
which are no longer fatal or crippling, but which may become so
when left untreated.31 In these situations, the plaintiffs sue in their
strong incentive to prevent the occurrence of the harm. Not infrequently one reason
for imposing liability is the deliberate purpose of providing that incentive.
W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 4, at 25 (5th ed. 1984).
27. See infra notes 116-21 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 117-30 and accompanying text.
29. See supra note 25.
30. See Brief for Appellant at 8-9, Brown v. Laitner, No. 73903 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985).
For a discussion of the charges alleged, see Plaintiff-Appellant's Reply Brief at 3, Brown v.
Laitner, No. 73903 (Mich. Ct. App. filed June 13, 1986). Cf. Baumgartner v. First Church of
Christ, Scientist, 141 11. App. 3d 898, 904, 490 N.E.2d 1319, 1323 (holding that a determination of a breach of any duty would require a searching inquiry into Christian Science beliefs
and the validity of those beliefs), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 317 (1986).
31. For a recent discussion of the harms resulting from the inaction of faith healers, and
their defense of the right to worship, see Dobbin, When a state takes aim at faith healing,
U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Mar. 24, 1986, at 22; Zlatos, A Child's Death: An Act of God or
Homocide, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 17, 1984, at 6 (describing a 26 day old baby's death which could
have been avoided with three dollars worth of antibiotics); CHILD, Spring, 1986, at 3 (citing
three deaths of Ohio children whose parents belong to an offshoot sect of Faith Assembly);
Mortimer, State Should Stop Needless Deaths, Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 27, 1986 at 9-A,
col. 1 (documenting the death, due to untreated pneumonia, of a thirteen-month-old child of a
member of the Christ Assembly); CHILD, Fall, 1986, at 1 (detailing the death of a seven-yearold child due to diabetes, left untreated pursuant to the religious beliefs of parents). See generally Swan, ChristianScience, FaithHealing & the Law, 309 FREE INQUIRY, Spring 1984, at 4
(discussing a former Christian Science Church member's statement of how the church prevented her from getting medical treatment for her fifteen-month-old son who ultimately died
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capacity as representatives of the deceased or injured child.32
Who may these children depend upon for protection? Certainly
not their devout parents. In most states, parents are exempt from
prosecution for neglect if they are providing their children with spiritual healing in lieu of needed medical care. Courts, however, have
recently struck down some of these statutes as unconstitutional and
in violation of the establishment clause, 4 or have interpreted them in
a way that circumvents their purpose."
II.

CHURCH IMMUNITY

A.

Generally

Churches are not above the law. 6 The first amendment does not
grant immunity to churches for their tortious conduct.3 7 Churches
from advanced meningitis).
32. See, e.g., Reply Brief for Appellant, Brown v. Laitner, No. 73903 (Mich. Ct. App.
filed June 13, 1986) (alleging negligence and misrepresentation in the death of a fifteen month
old child in an action against First Church of Christ Scientist and its agents).
33. See, e.g., COLO. REV.STAT. § 19-1-114 (1986), which provides:
Notwithstanding any other provisions of this title, no child who in good faith is
under treatment solely by spiritual means through prayer in accordance with the
tenets and practices of a recognized church or religious denomination ... shall, for
that reason alone, be considered to have been neglected within the purview of this
title.
Id. See also Note, Faith Healing Exemptions to Child Protection Laws: Keeping the Faith
Versus Medical Care For Children, 12 J. LEGIs. 243 (1985) (documenting the devastating
effects on children which result from religious exemptions in child neglect laws in over 40
states and the present public outcry for legislatures to repeal these exemptions). Contra Comment, ParentalFailureto Provide Child with Medical Assistance Based on Religious Beliefs
Causing Child's Death-Involuntary Manslaughterin Pennsylvania, 90 DICK. L. REv. 861
(1986) (advocating spiritual healing exemptions for parents who practice religious faith healing and concluding that the inequity which results from punishing parents by imprisonment is
not outweighed by the benefit to society).
34. See, e.g., State v. Miskimens, 22 Ohio Misc. 2d 43, 44-46, 490 N.E.2d 931, 933-35
(Ct. C.P. 1984) (holding statute proscribing child endangerment which exempted parents who
treat illness by prayer alone violated the establishment clause by involving the state in determinations of questions not the business of the government and application of the statute would
result in excessive government entanglement).
35. See People ex rel. D.L.E., 645 P.2d 271 (Colo. 1982). The Supreme Court of Colorado adjudicated the case of a dependent child whose life was in imminent danger due to lack
of medical treatment, despite language in the statute which precluded such a finding if the
child was being treated in good faith by spiritual means for that reason alone. The court
interpreted "for that reason alone" to mean that if there were other reasons for a finding of
dependancy, such as deprivation of medical care to the point of life endangerment, the child
may be adjudicated dependent and neglected under the law. Id. at 274-75.
36. See infra notes 37-39, 43 and accompanying text.
37. See, e.g., Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1134 (D.
Mass. 1982) (noting that "even if [the defendant] were to [be a] religious institution, the free
exercise clause would not immunize it from all common law causes of action alleging tortious
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may be subject to civil liability for breach of contract3 8 and misrepresentation 9 with the caveat that the court may not, in so doing,
determine the validity of a particular religious belief,40 decide ecclesiastical questions,41 or settle matters involving internal church procedure."2 In fact, a cause of action based upon proscribed conduct
activity") (citing Turner v. Unification Church, 473 F. Supp. 367, 371 (D.R.I. 1978), aff'd,
602 F.2d 458 (1st Cir. 1979)); Nally v. Grace Community Church, 194 Cal. App. 3d 1147,
240 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1987) (refusing to create a defense of "clergy immunity" for church
affiliated counselors who are treating mentally disturbed, suicidal people rejecting the defense . . .out of a profound reverence for ... constitutional values ... and for the value of
human life); Alberts v. Devine, 395 Mass. 59, 479 N.E.2d 113 (1985) (holding that judicial
inquiry is appropriate where a controversy exists as to breach of physician's duty of confidentiality allegedly induced by church superior), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1014 (1985); Bear v. Reformed Mennonite Church, 462 Pa. 330, 341 A.2d 105 (1975) (noting that courts may adjudicate disputes alleging shunning practices resulting in alienation of affections and tortious
interference with business relationships).
38. See VanLoock v. Curran, 489 So. 2d 525 (Ala. 1986) (holding that a civil court has
jurisdiction to adjudicate regardless of whether the plaintiff bringing action for breach of contract and misrepresentation, was improperly expelled from school); Gipson v. Brown, 288 Ark.
422, 428, 706 S.W.2d 369, 373 (1986) (holding that although civil courts lack jurisdiction to
decide religious questions, it does not follow that they may not assume jurisdiction over religious entities). See also Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d
1164, 1171 (4th Cir. 1985) (stating that "churches are not-and should not be--above the law
Like any other person or organization, they may be held liable for their torts and upon
their valid contracts."), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3333 (1986).
39. See, e.g., Christofferson v. Church of Scientology, 57 Or. App. 203, 241, 644 P.2d
577, 601 (1982) (stating "It is clear that a religious organization, merely because it is such, is
not shielded by the First Amendment from all liability for fraud"), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1227

(1983).
40. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944) (holding an inquiry into truth or falsity
of religious beliefs constitutionally impermissible in a prosecution for mail fraud and misrepresentation against the leader of the "I Am" movement). For an exhaustive examination of
Ballard, see Weiss, Privilege, Posture and Protection: "Religion" in the Law, 73 YALE LJ.
593, 593-608 (1964).
41. Pfeifer v. Christian Science Comm. on Publications, 31111. App. 3d 845, 334 N.E.2d
876 (1975) (holding that the civil court lacks jurisdiction to decide whether a religious doctrine departs from the standards of the church); Patterson v. Bethel Baptist Church, 389
N.W.2d 729, 732-33 (Minn. 1986) (holding that the first amendment prohibits civil courts
from settling church doctrinal disputes).
42. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981) (holding that "[c]ourts
are not arbiters of scriptual interpretation"); Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v.
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976) (holding that civil courts must accept the decisions of the
governing body of a hierarchical church in areas of discipline, faith, internal structure, and
ecclesiastical doctrines); Hutchison v. Thomas, 789 F.2d 392 (6th Cir.) (affirming the dismissal of minister's claim of, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress and breach of
contract resulting from his forced retirement), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 277 (1986); Kaufmann
v, Sheehan, 707 F.2d 355, 358-59 (8th Cir. 1983) (affirming the dismissal of defamation,
conspiracy and violation of due process charges where the dispute involved internal procedures
of the archdiocese); First Baptist Church of Glen Este v. Ohio, 591 F. Supp. 676, 683 (S.D.
Ohio 1983) (stating that barring severe civil rights violations or fraud, a civil court may not
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may withstand a motion to dismiss despite the fact that the defendant is acting pursuant to religious beliefs or operates for a religious
purpose."
In recent years courts have recognized that the first amendment
does not insulate defendants from liability for intentional tortious
conduct44 or involuntary servitude 45 by virtue of their having
achieved status as a religious organization. Although courts have
considered the inhibiting effect on religious expression which results
from imposing tort liability on clergy, when liability is ultimately
imposed, the state's interests are of sufficient magnitude to override
the free exercise rights involved."
The adjudication of a common law negligence action does not
involve the constitutionally prohibited inquiry into religious doctrine,
or a determination of the veracity or falsity of religious beliefs; 47 nor
does it necessitate deference to church tribunals pursuant to provisions of their individual constitutions." Accordingly, the first amendment should not bar resolution of the objective secular evaluation of
the reasonableness of faith healers' conduct, much the same as it has
inquire into internal church disciplinary matters); Madsen v. Irwin, 395 Mass. 715, 481
N.E.2d 1160 (1985) (following Serbian, holding that civil courts must accept the decisions of
church tribunals in case of alleged improper termination for sexual preference).
43. See Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology, 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1134-35 (D. Mass.
1982) (refusing to resolve counts alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress and fraudulent inducement by misrepresentation).
44. Alberts v. Devine, 395 Mass. 59, 479 N.E.2d 113 (holding a minister's civil action
against his church superior for inducing a physician to breach his duty of confidentiality, was
not barred by the first amendment), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 546 (1985). See Esbeck, supra
note 8, at 96-97; see generally Young & Tigges, Into the Religious Thicket-Constitutional
Limits on Civil Court Jurisdictionover EcclesiasticalDisputes, 47 OHIo ST. L.J. 475 (1986).
45. See Turner v. Unification Church, 473 F. Supp. 367 (D.R.I. 1978) (stating in dicta
that a free exercise claim does not immunize a defendant from actions which allege involuntary servitude or intentional tortious activity), affd, 602 F.2d 458 (1st Cir. 1979).
46. Alberts, 395 Mass. at 60-61, 479 N.E.2d at 123 (stating the importance of a physician's duty to respect the confidentiality while involved in a physician/patient relationship
gives rise to a tort action when that duty is breached notwithstanding the circumstances of
defendants being church superiors).
47. See supra note 40.
48. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979) (stating that the state has an obvious and legitimate interest in the peaceful resolution of property disputes, and in providing a civil forum
where the ownership of church property can be determined conclusively); First Baptist Church
of Glen Este v. Ohio, 591 F. Supp. 676 (S.D. Ohio 1983); Piletich v. Deretich, 328 N.W.2d
696, 701 (Minn. 1982) (holding that Minnesota courts will apply the neutral principles of law
test announced in Jones, to determine whether a dispute involving a religious organization may
be resolved in a civil court).
The state interest in protecting its youth is at least as compelling as the interest in the
peaceful resolution of property disputes. See also infra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
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not protected a religious organization from the adjudication of a
cause of action alleging misrepresentation. 49
The application of "neutral principles of law," 50 which are employed in the adjudication of church-involved property disputes, 51
can be utilized to determine liability by exercise of general principles
of tort law.5 2 It is important to observe that a common law negligence action is not a cleverly constructed "handle" which functions
to permit adjudication of an underlying doctrinal issue. The issue is
simply the negligent conduct of the faith healer.
B.

Religious Conduct Versus Religious Belief

Although intervention in disputes centering on church doctrinal
matters, policy, or discipline is not constitutionally permissable, 5' religious conduct is not immune from regulation by, and the jurisdiction of, the civil courts.55 This belief/action distinction was first announced by the Supreme Court in Reynolds v. United States,56 in
which a conviction for bigamy was affirmed notwithstanding the defendant's religious beliefs, which dictated that he be polygamous.
Although the faith healer's conduct may be motivated by religious beliefs, since Reynolds it is well settled law that while the first
amendment insures that freedom to believe is absolute, conduct, albeit religiously motivated, may be subject to limitations for the wel49. Christofferson v. Church of Scientology, 57 Or. App. 203, 644 P.2d 577 (1982)
(holding that if the statements do not concern the beliefs and practices of the religion, they do
not merit first amendment protection).
50. Jones, 443 U.S. at 603-04. The Court stated that:
The primary advantages of the neutral-principles approach are that it is completely

secular in operation, and yet flexible enough to accomodate all forms of religious
organization ....The method relies exclusively on objective, well-established con-

cepts of trust and property law familiar to lawyers and judges. It thereby promises
to free civil courts completely from entanglement in questions of religious doctrine,

polity and practice.
Id. at 603
51. See Jones, 443 U.S. at 602; Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969).
52. See infra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
53. But cf. Patterson v. Bethel Baptist Church, 389 N.W.2d 729, 733 (Minn. 1986)
(holding that the presence of a claimed property right in a church doctrinal dispute does not

remove the bar on a civil court's jurisdiction of such a dispute).
54.

See, e.g., Jones, 443 U.S. at 602 (1979);

Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v.

Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709 (1976); Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary
Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969).
55. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940).
56. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
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fare of society.5 7 Thus, the first amendment embraces two separate
concepts: 8 religious beliefs are protected by the first amendment
when they are in the realm of pure belief, and the amount of protection decreases when religious action has public manifestations." Action which affects others in ways not limited to their beliefs triggers
public interests. The ramifications of subjecting children to spiritual
treatment in lieu of needed medical care goes beyond the realm of
pure belief. Even if spiritual healing is regarded as religious belief,
rendering it as an expression entitled to absolute protection, its effect
on children removes it from that protection."0
The state has the authority to regulate conduct which interferes
in areas of high state interest, even in light of the establishment 61
and free exercise 62 clauses of the first amendment. In Prince v.
Massachusetts,6s and its progeny,6 4 the Supreme Court developed

57. See Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303-04.
58. Id. at 303.
59. See Weiss, supra note 40, at 608 (noting that a traditional feeling about the world
of law and the world of religion is that the state may not interfere in the world of religion but
that when a man participates in the world of public life he must meet its secular and legal
standards).
60.

See T. EMERSON,

THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

(1970). Emerson states:

It is necessary to define the "system" to which the foregoing principles are applicable. For reasons peculiar to each case, certain sectors of social conduct, though involving "expression" within the definition here used, must be deemed to fall outside
the system with which we are now concerned. The areas which must be excluded
embrace certain aspects of ... the activities of children .... This does not mean

that the First Amendment has no application in these sectors. It simply recognizes
that the functions of expression and the principles needed to protect expression in
such areas are different from those in the main system, and that different legal rules
may therefore be required.
Id. at 19-20 (emphasis added). See also Pepper, Reynolds, Yoder, and Beyond: Alternatives
for the Free Exercise Clause, 1981 UTAH L. REv. 309, 370-72. In postulating a broad interpretation of the free exercise clause, a brake on this interpretation is that it cannot operate to
impose substantial harm to non-consenting third parties. Although children fall into this category, the denial of freedom to impose one's beliefs on one's children would amount to a hollow
freedom of religion from the parental point of view. Accordingly, for freedom of religion to be
absolute, children are presumed to consent to all practices but those "that so clearly, permanently, and seriously injure a child as to be intolerable to a substantial majority of the population." Id. at 372.
61. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
62. Id.
63. 321 U.S. 158 (1944). State child labor law did not unduly infringe upon religious
freedom of a Jehovah's Witness, convicted for allowing her niece to hand out religious literature on a street corner. Although the distribution was a religious duty of this sect and application of the law resulted in restricting religious free exercise rights, the Court nevertheless held
that "[t]he right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose the community or
the child to communicable disease or the latter to ill health ...." Id. at 166-67. Although
"[p]arents may be free to become martyrs themselves... it does not follow they are free, in
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the principle that free exercise and parental rights must yield when
it is necessary to advance the state's profound interest in children o5
Free exercise rights may prevail over secular matters affecting
adults, however, those rights must be restricted when the well-being
of a child is at stake."6

III.

INFRINGING FREE EXERCISE RIGHTS OF FAITH HEALERS

A.

Imposing a Duty of Reasonable Care

Faith healers should be treated no differently than other alternative health care providers. A civil court should hold faith healers
to a standard of reasonable care in the deliverance of their services.6
The application of the common law reasonable person standard6 8 can
identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their children before they have reached the age of
full and legal discretion when they can make that choice for themselves." Id. at 170. See also
People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E. 243 (1903).
64. See, e.g., Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D.
Wash. 1967), a.fd, 390 U.S. 598 (1968) (per curiam) (holding that a parent has no legal
right to deny a child proper medical treatment, even though it violates the religious belief of
the parent); In re Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
978 (1964); People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill.
618, 104 N.E.2d 769, cert. denied, 344
U.S. 824 (1952).
65. Prince, 321 U.S. at 164-71.
66. Id. at 168-70. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). (holding that state did
not show a compelling interest and that free exercise rights were violated by application of a
compulsory attendance education statute to members of Amish sect); see also Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (holding Sunday closing does not prohibit religious conduct but
merely has the effect of rendering the practice of the affected religion more expensive which is
not determinative of whether or not the statute violates free exercise of religion); Catholic
High School Ass'n v. Culvert, 753 F.2d 1161 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that the first amendment
does not prohibit the SLRB from exercising jurisdiction between parochial schools and lay
teachers).
67. See Nally v. Grace Community Church, 194 Cal. App. 3d 1147, 240 Cal. Rptr. 215
(1987) (holding a pastoral counselor to the minimal standard of due care of a non-therapist
counselor, notwithstanding the counselor's religious affiliation).
Negligence has been defined as "conduct which involves an unreasonably great risk of
causing damage, or, more fully, conduct 'which falls below the standard established by law for
the protection of others against unreasonably great risks of harm.'" W. PROSSER & W. KEE-

TON, supra note 26, § 31, at 169.
68. The reasonable person standard represents the standard of conduct which the community demands. It is an external and objective standard, rather than subjective and individual, since the law must operate neutrally. It is also adjusted to take into consideration the risk
apparent to the actor, his ability to meet it, and the circumstances of the conduct.
"[N]egligence is a failure to do what the reasonable person would do 'under the same or
similar circumstances.'" W. PROSSER & W. KETON, supra note 26, § 32, at 175. For example, in May v. Laitner, No. 80-004-605 (Mich. Cir. Court, Sept. 24, 1980), the church was
charged as negligent in failing to act reasonably by, inter alia:
(a) failing to sufficiently educate and train practitioners and nurses in their treatment with and of small children;
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be accomplished without delving into the constitutionally protected
area of church doctrine and internal regulations.
The course of conduct followed by spiritual healers of the Christian Science Church, for example, gives rise to a duty to act as a
reasonable alternative health care provider would, and permits an
inquiry by a civil court as to deviation from that standard. 9 This
particular church enjoys a host of secular benefits such as reimbursement from private health insurance companies,70 federal funding
from Medicare, 71 and recognition as a health care provider from the
(b) failing to instruct practitioners in the rudiments of communicable notifiable disease so that reporting obligations could be carried out;
(c) failing to adequately monitor and supervise the activities of practitioners and
nurses in their treating of minor children.
Id. at 9-10.
The circuit court held that plaintiffs may maintain a cause of action for negligent acts
where the church violated a common law standard of care, as opposed to an internal doctrinally-based standard of care. Subsequently, the Michigan Court of Appeals ruled that the
reasonable person standard does not provide a sufficiently secular standard. Brown v. Laitner,
No. 73903, slip op. at 12 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 1986). The court hypothesized that had the
defendants been negligent per se, i.e. in violation of a statute enacted to protect children, a
different result might be required. Id.
69. For example, insurance companies throughout the industry currently recognize
Christian Science treatment. Christian Science members are instructed that practitioners are
authorized to certify sick leave and disability claims for federal employees and railroad employees. See, e.g., LEGAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF CHRISTAIN SCIENTISTS IN WASHINGTON (Spring 1978); LEGAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF CHRISTIAN SCIENTISTS IN CALIFOR-

(1984).
70. See Lynch, A Church in Crisis: ChristianScience Sect Has Hope and Charity,But
Faith is Declining, Wall St. J., Feb. 27, 1979, at 1, col. I (noting that Blue Cross and Blue
Shield in 14 states, as well as the 15 largest life insurance companies and 300 casualty companies cover Christian Science care). Christian Science treatment is also recognized under Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS), a supplemental
program to the Uniformed Services direct medical care system. Like a private medical insurance program, CHAMPUS is designed to assist its beneficiaries in obtaining certain prescribed
medical care from civilian services. See 32 C.F.R. § 199.12 (1985). The service provided is of
"an extra-medical nature" and, consequently, licensing and monitoring requirements are not
deemed applicable. Id. Christian Science nurses and practitioners must be accredited by the
First Church of Christ, Scientist, Boston, Mass., and listed in a Christian Science Journal at
the time the service is provided. 32 C.F.R. § 199.8 (1985).
71. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(y) (1983) Social Security Amendments of 1965, § 186 1(y)
(defining skilled nursing facility to include a Christian Science sanatorium operated or listed
and certified by the First Church of Christ Scientist); 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(e)(9) (1983) (providing that hospital insurance benefits may be paid for the services of a Christian Science sanatorium). These institutions participate as hospitals and are subject to the regular coverage and
exclusions of inpatient hospital care. For example, benefits are payable for services of a Christian Science nurse unless her duties are those of a private duty nurse. Benefits, however, will
not be paid for services of a Christian Science practitioner, because he is the equivalent of a
physician and the plan does not cover physician's services. In general, items and services which
are analogous to those for which benefits can be paid to a hospital will be paid. See also
NIA
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Internal Revenue Service72 which authorizes deductions for amounts
paid to church practitioners, nurses and sanatoria as medical expenses. Such an established course of conduct encourages direct detrimental reliance on the part of parents who depend upon the spiritual healers to cure their sick children.73
Healers of less recognized sects74 also have the duty to act reasonably, because of the protective relationship that exists between
healer and patient. The faith healer, when he undertakes treatment,
deprives a child of other opportunities for the care and protection of
his life.751
B.

The Compelling State Interest Standard

The Supreme Court has recognized that justification for an infringement on first amendment rights exists only in those instances
where the religious practice creates a substantial threat to public
safety, peace, or order.7 6 In other words, the state's interest must be
MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) 1983 Transfer binder § 1245, at 847 (describing inpatient Christian Science treatment in a Christian Science sanatorium in its capacity as a
hospital).
72.

See 26 U.S.C. § 213 (1982); I.R.S. PUBLICATION 17, YOUR FEDERAL INCOME TAX

119 (1985); Fed. Tax Coordinator 2d (RIA) § k-2100, at 32,056; supra note 71.
73. Cf. Florence v. Goldberg, 44 N.Y.2d 189, 375 N.E.2d 763, 404 N.Y.S.2d 583
(1978)(holding the city of New York liable where police department had voluntarily assumed
duty to provide a crossing guard causing reliance by the parent and resulting in the child being
struck by the car in the absence of the guard).
74. See supra notes 2, 5-6 and accompanying text.
75. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324 (1965) which provides in pertinent
part:
One who, being under no duty to do so, takes charge of another who is helpless
adequetely to aid or protect himself is subject to liability to the other for any bodily
harm caused to him by (a) the failure of the actor to exercise reasonable care to
secure the safety of the other while within the actor's charge ....
Id. § 324, at 139. The drafters of this section state in the comments that the rule is applicable
in circumstances where the actor takes charge of one who is ill or too young to care for himself. Id. § 324, at 140, comment b. See also Farwell v. Keaton, 396 Mich. 281, 240 N.W.2d
217 (1976) (holding that a mere social relationship gave rise to a duty to act with reasonable
care in a situation where one friend took charge of another who was unable to take care of
himself). A fortiori, where a sick child is surrendered to the care of a faith healer, the resultant relationship should trigger a duty to act reasonably.
76. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 1046 (1987) (holding that
Florida's denial of unemployment insurance benefits to a Seventh-Day Adventist due to her
religious beliefs violated the free exercise clause refusing to follow the lesser rational basis
standard articulated in Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986)); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963) (holding that South Carolina could not deny unemployment insurance benefits to a
Seventh-Day Adventist, discharged from employment because of her religious objection to
working on Saturdays and inability to find employment for the same religious motivation). See
generally Pepper, supra note 60.
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compelling.
Courts will weigh the competing interests in ruling on a free
exercise claim. 7 The protection of the health and welfare of children
is a state interest that has been held sufficient to warrant infringement of free exercise rights.7 8 Additionally, many interests have been
held to be of sufficient weight so as to justify infringement of free
9
exercise rights2
Where courts have determined that the burden imposed on one
claiming a violation of free exercise rights exceeds the state's interest
in enforcing a regulation or subjecting a defendant to the jurisdiction
of a civil court, the interests of the state are clearly of a less urgent
77. See, e.g., Nally v. Grace Community Church, 194 Cal. App. 3d 1147, 240 Cal.
Rptr. 215 (1987) (holding that California has a compelling state interest in preventing suicide,
and may promote this interest by the imposition of a standard of care which requires the
referral of suicidal individuals to institutions and professionals equipped to administer the necessary treatment and medication); State v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844
(Minn. 1985); see also United States v. Middleton, 690 F.2d 820 (11 th Cir. 1982)(finding that
the United States' interest in controlling the use of marijuana was sufficiently compelling to
outweigh defendant's free exercise right to use marijuana in connection with religious practices), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983). See generally Comment, Balancing the Free Religious Exercise Right Against Government Interests: State v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., 370
N.W.2d 844 (Minn. 1985), 9 HAMLINE L. REv. 649 (1986) (analyzing the court's ruling that
the government has a compelling interest in preventing employment discrimination which warranted infringement of defendant's free exercise rights to employ and promote only members
of his sect).
78. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
79. See, e.g., Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 477 U.S. 619
(1986) (preventing sex discrimination in employment); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986)
(prevention of Social Security fraud); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983)
(preventing racial discrimination in education); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971)
(insuring the ability to raise an army); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (assuring
the safety of individuals using public highways); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11
(1905) (prevention of communicable diseases); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878)
(prevention of polygamy); United States v. Snowden, 770 F.2d 393 (4th Cir. 1985) (prevention
of mail fraud); United States v. Rush, 738 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1984) , cert. denied, 470 U.S.
1004 (1985) (controlling of dangerous drugs); United States v. Middleton, 690 F.2d 820 (1 lth
Cir. 1982); Forest Hills Early Learning Center, Inc. v. Lukhard, 661 F.Supp. 300, 310 (E.D.
Va. 1987)(controlling operation of day care centers); United States v. Little, 638 F. Supp. 337
(D. Mont. 1986) (preservation of forest resources); Potter v. Murray City, 585 F. Supp. 1126
(D. Utah 1984) (prevention of polygamy); Candy H. v. Redemption Ranch, Inc., 563 F. Supp.
505 (M.D. Ala. 1983)(protecting the right to travel); Koolau Baptist Church v. Dep't. of Labor & Indus. Rel., 718 P.2d 267 (Haw. 1986) (maintenance of a state unemployment insurance program); Dep't of Social Servs. v. Emmanuel Baptist Pre-School, 150 Mich. App. 254,
388 N.W.2d 326 (1986) (controlling operation of day care centers); State ex rel. Pringle v.
Heritage Baptist Temple, Inc., 693 P.2d 1163 (Kan. 1985) (controlling operation of day care
centers); State ex. rel. Swann v. Pack, 527 S.W.2d 99 (Tenn. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
954 (1976) (prohibiting the use of snakes and strychnine in presence of children); State v.
Corpus Christi People's Baptist Church, Inc., 683 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. 1984) (controlling operation of day care centers).
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character and are readily distinguishable from the critical child protection interest. 80
C.

The Rational Relationship Standard

The state must demonstrate more than the mere existence of a
rational relationship between the conduct curtailed and the state's
interest to be sufficient enough to justify infringement of free exer8
cise rights. '
This lesser standard, however, was recently applied by the Supreme Court in Bowen v. Roy,8 2 and subsequently adhered to by a
lower federal court.8 3 These cases presented two very similar situations in which the interests burdened by the state's regulation were
the plaintiffs' free exercise of religion. In both cases the challenged
regulations were facially neutral, uniformly applied, and represented
a reasonable means of promoting a legitimate state interest.8 Arguably, the Supreme Court ratification of infringement on free exercise rights for the purpose of maintaining efficient functioning of a
governmental program, which is clearly of a less urgent character
than the protection of children, signals a more intrusive stance by
the Court. Accordingly, the imposition of judicial inquiry into the
80. See, e.g., Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164
(4th Cir. 1985) (holding that the first amendment bars a Title VII action brought by plaintiff
who was denied employment as pastor), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3333 (1986); McClure v.
Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir.) (finding that Title VII is not applicable to defendant
church), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896 (1972); Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n. for the Unification of
World Christianity, 179 Cal. App. 3d 450, 224 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1986) (holding that the effect
of church recruiting practices on a healthy adult did not pose a threat to public, health, safety
or order and were not subject to judicial inquiry); Meroni v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for the Unification of World Christianity, 119 A.D.2d 200, 506 N.Y.S.2d 174 (1986) (dismissing plaintiff's
cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress and noting that plaintiff's son was
not severly disabled and therefore, could independently determine whether or not to associate
himself with defendant church).
81. See, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 1046 (1987) (holding that a refusal to grant unemployment benefits due to religiously motivated actions may not
be justified by a determination under the rational relationship standard); Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (noting that "JI]t is basic that no showing merely of a rational
relationship to some colorable state interest would suffice").
82. 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (holding not violative of free exercise rights a federal statute
requiring issuance of a social security number as a condition precedent for participation in the
Aid to Families with Dependent Children program (AFDC) because the statute is facially
neutral and promotes a vital state interest: the prevention of fraud in a benefits program).
83. Leahy v. District of Columbia, 646 F. Supp. 1372, 1378 (D.D.C. 1986) (holding
Motor Vehicle Department regulation requiring agency usage of plaintiff's social security
number as a requirement for the issuance of a driver's license not violative of plaintiff's free
exercise rights).
84. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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conduct of religious faith healers could be sustained on the rational
basis standard.
Bowen held that the mandatory assignment of a social security
number to a child who receives benefits from the federal government, does not constitute a claim for a free exercise violation, even
though assigning it may be against the parent's religious beliefs. The
Court reasoned that enforcement of the statutory requirement promotes efficiency and prevention of fraud in the Social Security Program and is a reasonable means to achieve that end. 5 Similarly, judicial inquiry into the spiritual treatment of children is a reasonable
means of achieving the ultimate goal of protection of children, which
is, at the very least, an equally important state interest.8 6
D. Civil Liability as the Least Restrictive Means to Achieve the
State's Compelling Interest in the Protection of the Welfare of
Children
1. Minimal Intrusion.- The Supreme Court has held that an
infringement on free exercise rights may be justified by a showing
that there exists no less restrictive means of advancing a particular
compelling state interest.87 Thus, the state's use of the least restrictive means to achieve its goal, will render a regulation which burdens
88
a free exercise interest constitutional.
A civil negligence action may be the least restrictive means of
advancing the state's compelling interest in protecting the welfare of
children, since it does not involve the continuous surveillance, 9 in85. The court held that "the Government meets its burden when it demonstrates that a
challenged requirement for governmental benefits, neutral and uniform in its application, is a
reasonable means of promoting a legitimate public interest." Bowen, 476 U.S. at 701-08.
86. See infra notes 100-19 and accompanying text.

87. See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718-19 (1981) (holding the policy underlying an Indiana unemployment statute denying petitioner benefits, did not sufficiently rise to

the level of a compelling interest to justify burdening his free exercise rights, stating that
religious liberty may be curtailed if the state can demonstrate that there exists no less restric-

tive means of achieving a compelling state interest).
88. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1982) (stating that "[n]ot all
burdens on religion are unconstitutional ....

The state may justify a limitation on religious

liberty by showing that it is essential to accomplish an overriding governmental interest."); see
also Rushton v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 653 F. Supp. 1510 (D. Neb. 1987) (holding that

the state's compelling interest in the health, safety, and welfare of the public overcame nuclear
power plant employees' free exercise rights to refuse to submit to an alcohol rehabilitation

program and was the least restrictive means to advance the compelling state interest in assuring that nuclear power plant workers were fit for duty).
89. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in deciding a dispute concerning

clergy defendants, has recently held that civil litigation is not barred by the first amendment
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vestigation,90 promulgation, and enforcement of regulations 9 ' aimed
at churches engaged in spiritual healing which could arguably give
rise to a claim of violation of the establishment clause of the first
amendment.9 2
Recently, in first amendment challenges by defendant churches,
state courts have affirmed the application of regulations to churchrun child care facilities.9 3 These regulations necessarily involve sursince it "in no sense involves repetitious inquiry or continuing surveillance that would amount
to the excessive entanglement between government and religion that the First Amendment
prohibits." Alberts v. Devine, 395 Mass. 59, 75, 479 N.E.2d 113, 123, cerl. denied sub nom.
Carroll v. Alberts, 474 U.S. 1013 (1985). Cf. Archbishop of Roman Catholic Apostolic Archdiocese v. Guardiola, 628 F. Supp. 1173 (D.P.R. 1985) (holding that adherence to minimum
wage laws and production of wage rates for lay employees was constitutionally sound, however,
the government compelling a church to produce extensive data would amount to continuing
surveillance in violation of the establishment clause).
90, See Surinach v. Pesquera de Busquets, 604 F.2d 73 (1st Cir. 1979) (holding that the
Department of Consumer Affair's investigation into the rising costs of private education which
included parochial schools was not constitutionally permissible because it led to continuing
surveillance and entanglement between the church and state in violation of the first amendment) (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 667 (1970)).
91. See Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 305 (1985)
(holding The Fair Labor Standards Act applicable to a religious foundation since it was not
overly intrusive into religious affairs, observing that "[tihe Establishment clause does not exempt religious organizations from such secular governmental activity as fire inspections and
building and zoning regulations").
92. See supra note 7. The Supreme Court, in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 61213 (1971) set forth a three part test to determine whether governmental action is violative of
the establishment clause: (1) the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; (2) the statute's primary effect must not advance nor inhibit religion; and (3) the statute must not foster
excessive governmental entanglement. Church reliance on an establishment clause argument to
exempt church-run child care facilities from regulation has been held invalid because entanglement between church and state is not excessive. Carried to its logical conclusion, this analysis
runs afoul of the second prong of the Lemon test; the result would be to advance a religious
facility over a secular child care facility which must comply with regulations. See State v.
Corpus Christi People's Baptist Church, 683 S.W.2d 692, 695 (Tex. 1984), appeal dismissed,
474 U.S. 801 (1985).
93. For examples of court validation of regulations applying to church-run child care
facility regarding faculty educational restrictions, curriculum, and prohibition against corporal
punishment, see Forest Hills Learning Center, Inc. v. Lukhard, 661 F. Supp. 300 (E.D. Va.
1987); State ex rel. Pringle v. Heritage Baptist Temple, Inc., 693 P.2d 1163 (Kan. 1985);
Dep't of Social Servs. v. Emmanuel Baptist Pre-School, 150 Mich. App. 254, 388 N.W.2d 326
(1986). See also State v. Corpus Christi People's Baptist Church, 683 S.W.2d 692, 695 (Tex.
1984) (holding that a church-run child care facility must comply with state licensure requirements which fulfill the states's compelling interest of protecting children in child care facilities
from mental and physical harm and that the licensing requirements are the least restrictive
means to achieve that end), appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 801 (1985).
The Corpus Christicourt observed that the children are completely dependant upon these
church-run homes for their care and safety. Without the regulations, the state would be rendered powerless to intervene if children in these homes "became the victims of neglect, cruelty
or degredation in the name of spiritual regeneration." Id. at 696; see also State ex rel. Pringle
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veillance and intrusion but are sustained due to the compelling state
interest being advanced.94 The judicial system has recognized the
grave danger to children 5 which could ensue if defendant churches
are permitted to opt out of a statutory system96 designed to protect
children97 and which applies to all other similarly situated organizations which lack the protective shield of religious affiliation.
By subjecting churches to judicial inquiry into their allegedly
negligent conduct in the treatment of children, the state may achieve
its vital goal of protecting the welfare of children 8 in a manner
which is the least restrictive means. A civil suit will also serve to
safeguard the welfare of children who may be harmed subsequently
due to the negligent omission of medical care by faith healers.99
There is considerable precedent to support the state's authority,
as parenspatriae,100 to impose civil liability on faith healers in order
v. Heritage Baptist Temple, Inc., 236 Kan. 544, 693 P.2d 1163 (1985) (holding that a church
operated day care center must abide by state licensing requirements notwithstanding the religious instruction that was offered in the program).
94. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. The Michigan Court of Appeals has
taken this position one step further. The court affirmed an order enjoining a fundamentalist
church from operating an unlicensed day care center, but reversed the lower court's grant of
exemptions from the licensure scheme to the church. The regulations demanded educational
requirements for the program director, required that a program foster a positive self-concept in
children, prohibition against corporal punishment, and inspection of the financial records of
child care organizations by the Department of Social Services. Department of Social Servs. v.
Emmanuel Baptist Pre-School, 150 Mich. App. 254, 388 N.W.2d 326 (1986), appeal granted,
428 Mich. 909, 409 N.W.2d 199 (1987).
On the issue of prohibition of corporal punishment within a church-operated facility, the
court held:
The state's interest is clear and compelling. The rule protects very young children
from pysical harm by prohibiting potentially abusive forms of discipline. . . . Thus,
although the prohibition against spanking with a ping pong paddle burdens the
church's free exercise of its religious beliefs, the state's interest in protecting the
very young outweighs the burden .... [W]e recognize that some practices rooted in
religious principle may be dangerous to the health and welfare of certain members
of society ... It is not beyond the power of government to prevent such practices
through regulation.
Id. at 271, 388 N.W.2d at 334 (emphasis added).
95. Corpus Christi, 683 S.W.2d at 692.
96. Michigan's Child Care Organization Act protects through licensing and regulation
of child care organizations. To operate a child care center, an entity must apply for a license.
The statute authorizes the Dep't. of Social Services to develop rules for the care and protection
of children in covered organizations. Emmanuel Baptist, 150 Mich. App. at 254, 388 N.W.2d
at 326.
97. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
98. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
99. See supra note 26 for a discussion of the prophylactic effect of civil liability.
100. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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to protect living children presently at risk due to their parents' religious practices.10 1 Alternatives exist which may foster the goal of
child protection, but each tend to promote constitutionally impermissible entanglement between church and state in violation of the establishment clause. 0 2 The alternatives include supervision of faith
healers through licensing requirements, secular educational requirements, and imposition of record-keeping regulations.'
Despite the concern over potential entanglement, surveillance
has been upheld where the protection of children is the state's
goal.10 4 Additionally, the adjudication of a civil negligence action is
not a continuous investigation and surveillance which has been held
to be violative of the first amendment in other circumstances. 0 5 A
simple imposition of a duty to act reasonably in the treatment of
children would be less burdensome on the church than detailed regulations which have nonetheless been upheld on first amendment
challenges.10
2. The Parens Patriae Role of the State.- Courts have uniformly held that the first amendment protects the right of a competent adult to refuse necessary medical treatment in accordance with
his or her religious beliefs.'0 In accordance with that principle,
courts have not allowed a plaintiff to state a cause of action for neg101. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
102. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490 (1979) (holding that the NLRB exercise of jurisdiction over diocesan schools in determining whether an unfair labor practice existed fostered excessive entanglement between church and state). See generally Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and
the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373 (1981).
103. See, e.g., Surinach v. Pesquera de Busquets, 604 F.2d 73, 78 (1st Cir. 1979) (citing
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 675 (1970)).
104. See supra notes 93-95.
105. See Alberts v. Devine, 295 Mass. 59, 75, 479 N.E.2d 113, 123, cert. denied sub
nom. 474 U.S. 1013 (1985). Civil litigation is far less intrusive for the Christian Science
Church than the present government entanglement fostered pursuant to governmental regulations. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(y) (1983); 32 C.F.R. §§ 199.8, 199.12 (1985).
106. See supra notes 93-95.
107. See, e.g., In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. 1972) (holding that no compelling
state interest existed to interfere with competent adult's decision to refuse blood transfusion);
St. Mary's Hosp. v. Ramsey, 465 So. 2d 666 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that a mentally competent patient suffering from kidney disease could refuse blood transfusion); In re
Brooks' Estate, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 373-74, 205 N.E.2d 435, 442 (1965) (holding that the state has
no vital countervailing interest to warrant interference so as to prevent a competent adult from
deciding to forego medical treatment). Cf. In re Brown, 478 So. 2d 1033 (Miss. 1985) (stating
that the state's interest in keeping an eyewitness alive to testify at a murder trial is not of
sufficient magnitude to override an individual adult's right to refuse a blood transfusion consistent with free exercise of religion).
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ligence on behalf of a competent adult when the choice to follow the
tenets of a particular faith is independently made. 08 Children, however, present a more difficult problem.
The state has traditionally acted in its role as parens patriae to
protect a child whose life is in imminent danger.1"9 In light of situations which have precipitated this state role, the logical extension of
the parens patriae doctrine is the imposition of civil liability as the
least restrictive means110 of advancing the state's compelling interest
in the protection of children.'
The circumstances giving rise to judicial intervention usually involve either a hospital seeking a court order to administer necessary
medical treatment to a child over the objections of parents whose
religious beliefs prohibit such procedures,"' or a social agency bringing an action to have a child declared neglected and dependent so
that needed treatment may be ordered."13 Judicial intervention has
been invoked where the patient is not a child, but rather the mother
of a minor whose welfare depends upon the mother's survival."'
Likewise, courts have intruded upon free exercise rights to protect
108. Baumgartner v. First Church of Christ, Scientist, 141 Ill. App. 3d 898, 907-08, 490
N.E.2d 1319, 1325-26, cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 317 (1986).
109. See supra notes 25, 29-35 and accompanying text.
110. See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); see also Jehovah's Witnesses v.
King County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. 1967) (holding that a "dependant child"
statute, and the requiring of Jehovah's Witnesses to sustain blood transfusions was constitutionally valid in view of the strong state interest involved), aff'd, 390 U.S. 598 (1968); Muhlenberg Hosp. v. Patterson, 128 N.J. Super. 498, 320 A.2d 518 (1974) (stating that the court
has authority to order a blood transfusion where denial presents a danger of irreparable brain
damage to an infant). See generally Comment, Roy v. Cohen: Social Security Numbers and
the Free Exercise Clause, 36 AM. U.L. REv. 217, 218 (1986).
111. See supra note 87.
112. Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp., 390 U.S. 598 (1968); Muhlenberg
Hosp. v. Patterson, 128 N.J. Super. 498, 320 A.2d 518 (1974).
113. People ex rel. D.L.E., 645 P.2d 271, 276 (Colo. 1982); See also In re Hamilton,
657 S.W.2d 425, 426 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983) (affirming the lower court's holding that a child
afflicted with cancer was dependent and neglected when the parents, members of a sect that
eschewed medical care, refused to allow the administration of pain relief and treatment). See
generally Comment, Prayingfor Relief From Parens Patriae:Should a Child be Allowed to
Refuse Life-Saving Medical Treatment on Religious Grounds?, 2 J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'v
673 (1986).
114. See, e.g., In re Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.) (holding that
the state, as parens patriae,has a compelling interest in sustaining the life of a mother of a
dependent child), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964). But cf. In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372
(D.C. 1972) (stating that there was no compelling state interest to override a 34 year old
father's refusal to accept a blood transfusion given the fact that the care and support of his
minor children were provided for in the event of his death).
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the life of a viable fetus." 5
Judicial intervention is not limited exclusively to those situations
where a child's life is threatened because of parental adherence to
religious beliefs. Courts have intervened when the quality of life
rather than life itself is6 jeopardized if medical treatment is not administered to a child.
3. Mootness.- The state's paramount interest in child protection is not rendered moot when a particular child has already died or
has been severely injured. Harm to children because of negligent
treatment by faith healers is, unfortunately, likely to occur repeatedly given the recent growth of religious sects that oppose medical
treatment.117 A judicial decision on the merits and resolution of the
liability issue would benefit the public interest 1 8 by assisting liti115. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d
457 (1981) (sustaining an order requiring a pregnant woman to undergo medical procedures to
protect the life of her unborn child and holding that the state's interest in sustaining the life of
a viable fetus outweighed the mother's right to free exercise of religion, right to refuse medical
care, and right to parental autonomy); Crouse Irving Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Paddock, 127
Misc. 2d 101, 485 N.Y.S.2d 443 (1985) (holding that blood transfusions may be administered
to a mother carrying a fetus, despite the mother's religious objections, since first amendment
protections must yield to the state's interest in protecting the health and welfare of its youth);
In re Jamaica Hosp., 128 Misc. 2d 1006, 491 N.Y.S.2d 898 (1985) (holding that patient's
interest in practice of religious beliefs was not sufficient to supercede state's interest in protecting the life of her fetus).
116. See, e.g., In re Sampson, 29 N.Y.2d 900, 278 N.E.2d 918, 328 N.Y.S.2d 686
(1972) (affirming per curiam the family court decision to order surgery to correct the function
and appearance of a disfiguring condition without placing the burden of decision on the boy);
In re Jensen, 54 Or. App. 1, 633 P.2d 1302 (1981) (affirming a court order for the placement
of the child with children's services where the child needed treatment for hydrocephalus, an
abnormal amount of fluid in the brain, which causes head enlargement and often severe mental
and physical problems, holding that the burden on the child, created by denial of treatment in
the name of religion, exceeded the permissible free exercise and family rights of the parents);
see also In re Gregory S., 85 Misc. 2d 846, 380 N.Y.S.2d 620 (Fain. Ct. 1976). But see In re
Green, 448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d 387 (1972) (holding that the state's interest was not of sufficient
magnitude to warrant a limitation on the parents' free exercise rights when the child's life was
not in imminent danger). The Green dissent agreed with Sampson, and observed that Wisconsin v. Yoder is limited by Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), and is inapplicable
where a parental decision poses a threat to the health or safety of the child. Green, 448 Pa. at
338, 292 A.2d at 387.
117. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
118. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Supreme Court held that pregnancy is
an example of an activity which is not rendered moot, though it terminated three years prior to
the litigation. It is "capable of repetition, yet evading review." Id. at 127 (citing Southern Pac.
Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911)). Accordingly, the Court held that plaintiff
had brought forth a justiciable controversy. Id. at 124.
Courts have recognized that although a case may be clearly moot, when there exists an
urgency to prescribe a rule of future conduct on a matter of public concern, an appellate court
should decide the issues. See, e.g., Super Tire Eng'g Co. v. McCorkle, 416 U.S. 115 (1974);
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gants and trial courts while also educating faith healers as to their
duty to act reasonably when they assume the treatment of
children."'
The state's interest when dealing with faith healers is even more
compelling than in the hospital or social agency cases 20 because the
authorities are denied the opportunity to intervene on behalf of the
welfare of the child at the time the life threatening crisis occurs."'21Although the injury or death has already occurred by the
time the controversy comes before the court, the issue is not moot
since the situation prevented the state from acting in its role as
parens patriae. Therefore, the plaintiffs are seeking accountability
from defendants who would have been subject to the intervention of
the court, had the court been aware of the threat at the critical time.
IV.

CIVIL COURT JURISDICTION THROUGH RECOGNITION OF THE
SECULAR NATURE OF FAITH HEALING ACTIVITIES AS HEALTH
CARE

Civil court jurisdiction is permissible when a church is engaged
in spiritual healing of an ill child rather than engaged in religious
instruction or indoctrination. Recently, in response to defendants' assertions that the first amendment precludes the exercise of National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) jurisdiction over their church-run
facilities, several circuit courts 122 have upheld the exercise of jurisJones v. State, 302 Md. 153, 158, 486 A.2d 184, 187 (1985); see also John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971) (holding that public interest in the
resolution of a controversy regarding a blood transfusion administered, and now moot, demanded a decision). But cf. Comment, supra note 33, at 885 (stating "it should be pointed out
that the state's interest in protecting the interest of the child evaporates with the death of the
child").
119. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 26, § 4, at 23.
120. See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
121. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
122. NLRB v. Salvation Army, 763 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1985) (holding that the NLRB had
jurisdiction over a church-operated day care center whose primary purpose was to provide
secular day care for children rather than teach religious doctrine); Volunteers of Am. Bar
None Boys Ranch v. NLRB, 752 F.2d 345 (8th Cir.) (holding that the NLRB had jurisdiction
over a treatment facility serving children and did not pose a significant risk of entanglement),
cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1028 (1985); Volunteers of Am. v. NLRB, 777 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir.
1985) (holding that the NLRB had jurisdiction over labor disputes in a church's alcohol rehabilitation program, because the program was conducted in a secular manner under contract
with the county, and funded mainly through federal block grants); Denver Post v. NLRB, 732
F.2d 769 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding that the NLRB had jurisdiction over church-operated
facilities which provide temporary shelter and care for women and children); St. Elizabeth
Hosp. v. NLRB, 715 F.2d 1193 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that the NLRB had sufficient jurisdiction over a religiously affiliated hospital to require collective bargaining with union);
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diction in labor disputes. Upon examination of the central objective
of each particular program, the courts concluded that the NLRB's
jurisdiction over the religious organizations did not present the risk
of noncompliance with the first amendment inherent in jurisdiction
over educational institutions. 123 The church-operated programs at issue were held not to be educational in nature even though the purpose of the organization had a religious character.
The same reasoning can be applied to support the exercise of
civil court jurisdiction over church-affiliated faith healers. In performing the secular task of healing as alternative health care providers, the faith healer's purpose is not to convert the parent or child to
a particular faith nor teach religious doctrine, which would bar civil
court jurisdiction. 24 A defendant faith healer does not state a valid
first amendment jurisdictional defense where the purpose of his acts
is to cure the child's physical condition, not to educate or indoctrinate the child.
In Volunteers of America v. NLRB,125 the Ninth Circuit held
that the NLRB properly asserted jurisdiction over a church-run alcoholism recovery program. The decision was based in part on the
fact that the operation in question was almost wholly funded with
federal block grants. 28 Such federal grants would preclude the dissemination of religious doctrine and thus distinguish the case from
the educational setting of NLRB v. Catholic Bishop,1 27 in which
NLRB jurisdiction was held not within the intent of Congress.
Volunteers of America is directly applicable to the Christian
Science Church, whose facilities receive federal funding, 2 " and
Tressler Lutheran Home for Children v. NLRB, 677 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding that

the NLRB had jurisdiction over a church-run nursing home was proper).
123. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490 (1979). But cf. Catholic High School
Ass'n v. Culvert, 753 F.2d 1161, 1171 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that jurisdiction may be exercised by the State Labor Relations Board in a dispute between lay teachers and religious
school managers, noting that "[s]tate labor laws are essential to the preservation of industrial
peace and sound economic order"). See generally Case Comment, Universidad Central de
Bayamon v. NLRB: Jurisdiction over Religious Colleges and Universities-The Need For
Substansive ConstitutionalAnalysis, 62 NOTRE

DAME

L. REv. 255 (1987).

124. NLRB v. Salvation Army, 763 F.2d 1, 3 (Ist Cir. 1985).
125.

777 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 1985).

126. Id. at 1390. Federal block grants, established in 1981, were designed to afford
states more discretion over the funding and administration of certain federal programs. Varon,
PassingThe Bucks: ProceduralProtections Under FederalBlock Grants, 18 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 231 (1983).

127. 440 U.S. 490 (1979). See Denver Post v. NLRB, 732 F.2d 769, 772 (10th Cir.
1984). See generally, Laycock, supra note 102, at 1373.
128. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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which could be subject to civil court jurisdiction on the same theory. 129 The church should not be able to assert the first amendment
as a defense to jurisdiction and inquiry by a civil court while it is the
recipient of federal funding for services which are analogous to secular health care. 130 The prohibition against propagation of religious
doctrine which accompanies receipt of federal funds removes the facility from the educational institution category and therefore jurisdiction does not give rise to the same risk of a first amendment
violation.
V.

CONCLUSION

Imposition of tort liability for negligent conduct in the faith
healing treatment of children is the least restrictive means toward
fulfilling the state's compelling interest of safeguarding the health
and welfare of its youth.1 31 States have long recognized this vital
interest as exemplified by their role as parens patriae232 Where the
circumstances are such that the state, acting through judicial intervention, was deprived of the opportunity to assume that role to protect a child's life, a civil court can extend the parens patriaerole of
the state and adjudicate the matter without delving into religious
doctrine or becoming involved in a long term surveillance of ongoing
religious activities.133
The precedential import of an inquiry into conduct as opposed
to a judicial dismissal on no-duty grounds134 will protect future chil129.

Although the aforementioned federally funded programs are not directed at the

treatment of children, the Ninth Circuit held that the secular nature of the services provided
to children and adults allowed NLRB supervision. Volunteers, 777 F.2d at 1390.

130. In enacting the Social Security Amendments of 1965, Congress explicitly provided:
Christian Science sanatoriums that are operated or listed and certified by the First

Church of Christ, Scientist, in Boston, could participate in the program as 'hospitals' ... In general, however, the committee intends... these sanatorium services to
be a substitute for, and not an addition to, medical services that might be furnished

to a person if his religious beliefs were not contrary to the use of usual facilities.
H.R. REP.No. 213, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 27, reprintedin 1965 US. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.

NEws 1943, 1971.
131.

See supra notes 25, 63 and accompanying text.

132. See supra notes 25, 63-66 and accompanying text.
133.
134.

See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text. For an illustration of a court which

usurps the province of the jury, deciding questions of fact concurrently with issues of law by
refusing to recognize a duty, see Baumgartner v. First Church of Christ, Scientist, 441 I11.

App. 3d 898, 490 N.E.2d 1319, cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 317 (1986). See generally Green,
Duties, Risks, CausationDoctrines, 41 TEx.L. REv.42 (1962). The determination of the duty

issue is based on general policy considerations such as "morality, the economic good of the
group, practical administration of the law, justice as between the parties, and other considera-
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dren from injury or death at the hands of religious faith healers. The
pairing of first amendment protection and "faith healing" could encourage affirmative treatment which would be potentially more dangerous than the garden variety spiritual healing which consists of
merely the absence of medical treatment. 35

tions relative to the environment out of which the case arose." Id. at 45. Courts have balanced
policy considerations, however, and have concluded that the benefits to society can outweigh
the burdens of a judicial imposition of a duty. See supra note 12.
135. See State v. Miskimens, 22 Ohio Misc. 2d 43, 46, 490 N.E.2d 931, 935 (1984).
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